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ABSTRACT
Social Networking for Botnet Command and Control
by Ashutosh Singh
A botnet is a group of compromised computers which is often a large group
under the command and control of a malicious user, known as a botmaster. Botnets
are generally recognized as a serious Internet threat. Botnets can be used for a
wide variety of malicious attacks including spamming, distributed denial of service,
and obtaining sensitive information such as authentication credentials or credit card
information. This project involves building a botnet centered on Twitter. Our botnet
uses individual bots controlled by commands tweeted by botmaster; the botnet can
expand in a viral manner by following affected Twitter user’s friends. This botnet is
only intended as a proof of concept and it does not perform any malicious actions.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
A botnet is a collection of compromised computers in a network [1]. A compro-
mised computer, known as a bot, can be used for attacks such as denial-of-service,
click fraud, identity theft, and spamming [1]. A botnet can have hundreds or thou-
sands of bots within its network [33]. Typically, a botnet has a command and control
[5] server that is used to control the bots within the network [15].
The goal of this project is to build a botnet that uses Twitter for its command and
control. Specifically, the botmaster will post tweets with pre-determined keywords.
To fetch these tweets from the botmaster account, bots will make a query to the
Twitter search engine.
To develop the command and control bot application for out botnet, we have
used Twitters Twitter4j [46] library and the Twitter authentication mechanism. In
effect, we have developed a covert channel [8] based on Twitter that enables the
botmaster to effectively communicate with the botnet.
1
1.1 Previous Work
In previous work [21][37], a number of attacks using a botnet were developed.
These attacks were as follows (Table 1):
Table 1: Previous Attacks.
Index Previously Developed Attacks
1 Browsing a Webpage
2 Capturing screenshot of user’s work
3 Shutdown and Restart the system
4 Downloading and Uploading the system
5 Denial of the Service Attack
We have performed the first four listed attacks (Table 1). We implemented
the same concept for the first three attacks. For the fourth attack, instead of
downloading and uploading the file to a particular web server, we have implemented
a mechanism in order to mail the file back to the botmaster. All four attacks are
described in detail in chapter four. Apart from the listed four attacks, we have
extended the number of attacks and we have added several more functionalities in
the botnet code. The added functionalities are listed in Table 2.
Table 2: Added Functionality.
Index Added Functionality
1 A graphical user interface for the Login prompts for the botmaster
2 Email functionality
3 Changing the authentication mechanism from the Basic to OAuth [17]
4 Modified the Key generation Algorithm
5 One generic attack method to accomodate more attacks easily
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The GUI for the login prompt prevents the botmaster’s code from being misused.
Basically, the GUI adds security to the botmaster code and no other user, apart from
the botmaster, can use tweets to post commands.
The email functionality is developed using a Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
(SMTP) [31]. Java has a simple mail application programming interface (API) [17]
and, using this API, we have developed a feature to exchange messages and data with
the botmaster in an easy and efficient manner.
We have changed the authentication mechanism to authenticate our applica-
tion using Twitter’s service with Twitter’s migration of Twitter4j API from Basic to
OAuth [24] in our application. Hence, now a user’s Id and password cannot be used
for authenticating the application to Twitter’s service. This guarantees that user-ids
and passwords are secure. We have modified the key generation algorithm in our
mechanism. We have a text file with predefined keywords, approximately 313. We
calculate the system time in milliseconds and then we determine the modulus of this
value with the number of keywords. The modulus generates an index of the keyword
used at any given time. The idea of using a text file is twofold. One is that keywords
used keep changing along with the time value so fewer opportunites arise for noticing
whether malicious activity occurs on the Twitter profile. Also, another advantage is
that keywords can be used as a query object to search for tweets on Twitter’s search
engine. Apart from using previous attack ideas, we have developed several attacks of
our own and they can be viewed in the order listed in Table 3.
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Table 3: Newly Developed Attacks.
Index New Attacks
1 Finding the last updated status of the botmaster
2 Updating and finding the recent 20 updated status of
the botmaster
3 Fetching the Twitter numeric ids, Twitter screenames
and profile pictures of the followers
4 Finding the Network Card Interface Details of the victim
computer
5 Finding the MAC addresses
6 Changing the mailing addresses of the botmaster and
bot
7 Finding the victim’s home directory path
8 Sending a text file with DOS commands to the bot
This paper is organized as follows: chapter two covers relevant background in-
formation on botnets and other related topics such as covert channels and communi-
cation protocols; chapter three discusses in detail the application we have developed
to handle a command and control structure based on Twitter; in chapter four, we
discuss various attacks that we have performed using our botnet; in chapter five we
analyze the results; chapter six mentions the experimental setup, comparison of our
botnet with Twitter-based NazBot, and the test cases we performed; finally, chapter




In this section we provide the background and discuss several important aspects
of the botnet and its design. Our botnet is based on Twitter’s command control
authentication mechanism. Twitter provides a Twitter4j [46] library for gaining the
authentication. Using this library we obtain several APIs in order to build our own
Java web application and easily integrate it within Twitter’s service.
2.1 Botnet Structure
In this section we discuss the aspects of building a generic botnet. There are
several components to take into consideration including: command and control struc-
ture; infection method; communication protocol; trigger events; and functionality
[42]. Once infected, a victim’s computer typically executes a script (known as a shell
code) that fetches an image of the actual bot binary from a specified location [1].
Upon completion of the download, the bot binary installs itself into the target ma-
chine so that it starts automatically each time the victim’s computer is rebooted [28].
A simple Internet Relay Chat (IRC) [18] based on a command and control (C&C)
mechanism has proven to be highly successful and has been adopted by botnets [14].
The basic purpose behind developing an IRC [18] channel is for instant messaging
and synchronous conferencing. Traditionally, an IRC is for online chat, audio/video
conferencing, and text based multi-user chat functions. The botnet command and
control traffic is difficult to detect as it follows normal protocol usage and is similar
to normal Internet traffic where the traffic volume is low [14]. Normal Internet traf-
fic means there are very few bots within the monitored network [14]. Additionally,
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a botmaster can use encrypted communication [14] to correspond to the bots. In
a command and control structure we see a centralized botnet where one or several
servers are used to issue commands. Command and control architecture is easy to
construct and is very efficient in nature for distributing botmaster commands.
Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channels are inherently suited for command and con-
trol mechanisms. Apart from an IRC [18] channel, we have a peer-to-peer mechanism
for communication with bots. In a peer-to-peer network any node in the network can
act as both the client and the server [13]. This is the reason why we do not have single
points of failure. Even if the botmaster within a peer-to-peer network is pulled down,
the rest of the network will continue to exist and function [13]. However, to form a
good and secure peer-to-peer network is not easy. The architecture is complex and is
the reason why many botmasters prefer a command and control structure using an
IRC [18] channel.
Figure 1 depicts that a general command and control botnet has a typical
botmaster who issues commands through Internet Relay Chat (IRC) Servers [18] to
a set of vulnerable hosts. Each vulnerable host is joined through an IRC channel
in which they can accept the bot code. After the bot code is downloaded and the
systems are exploited, they begin acting as a bot system. Now they actively look for
commands issued by the botmaster and perform as instructed by the command.
6
Figure 1: Life Cycle of a C&C Botnet.
There are several means used where a host can be exploited. These involve
a successful establishment of a backdoor channel [6] and, then using that channel,
sending commands to all vulnerable bot systems.
2.2 Command and Control
The command and control structure represents an organization of a botnet
in: the way it functions; the way it receives commands; updates its features for
performing various tasks; and the way it transmits data. The command and control
structure usually indicates how communication occurs between a botmaster and
remote bots. Botnets are typically organized into either a centralized structure or
a peer-to-peer structure. In a centralized structure, we have a central server that
is responsible for sending the commands and receiving the data from individual
bots. This, in practice, may be a system that has been compromised and can
be accessed securely by the botmaster without leaving any traces of identity.
We can have several servers acting as a botmaster throughout the lifetime of a
7
botnet and we can also frequently change them. The ability to have multiple
servers is important in case some of the botmasters are detected and brought down
by malware researchers or law enforcement agencies [9]. As we see in Figure 2,
a botmaster and two C&C servers are controlled by a single botmaster acting as bots.
Figure 2: Command and Control Architecture.
The centralized structure has been used traditionally and, more recently, we
see command and control botnets such as Proof-of-Concept (POC) Android botnet
[48], AgoBot [22], SpyBot [2], GTBot [2], and SDBot [16]. Recent malware POC
describes a proof of concept method that utilizes a short Messaging Service (SMS)
as a command & control channel [48]. It is fault tolerent since even if a smartphone
is not available on a GSM network, due to being powered off or in an out-of-service
range, when an SMS message arrives for delivery the message is queued and delivered
by the network [48]. The code [7] has been edited intentionally and is not to be used
for an attack purpose and, hence, an attacker has to develop their own functionality
for their attack purpose. In this method, [7] has tried to inject their bot code within
a smart phone (Android, iPhone, or Windows) through an SMS when they are sent
8
and received from a Telephony Stack (Userspace) to a Serial Line/Modem Driver.
After the author injects the code, they form a botnet with one master bot and some
sentinel bots; these are trustworthy long infected bots, along with some slave bots,
receiving instructions from sentinel bots in order to carry out instructions.
AgoBot is written in C/C++ with cross-platform capabilities [2]. Due to its
standard data structures, modularity, and code documentation, Agobot is simple for
an attacker to extend commands for their own purposes by simply adding new function
into the CommandHandler or CScanner class [16]. AgoBot has various commands in
order to control the victim host (e.g., using ”pctrl” to manage all the processes) using
”inst” to manage autostart programs [2]. In addition, AgoBot has following features
[22]: 1) it is IRC-based C2 framework; 2) it can launch various DoS attacks; 3) it
can attack a large number of targets; 4) it offers shell encoding function and limits
polymorphic obfuscations; 5) it can harvest sensitive information via traffic sniffing
(using libpcap, a packet sniffing library [16]), key logging, or searching registry entries;
6) it can evade detection of anti-virus software either through patching vulnerabilities,
closing back doors, or disabling access to anti-virus sites (using NTFS Alternate Data
Stream to hide its presence on victim host [16]); and 7) it can detect debuggers (e.g.,
SoftIce and Ollydbg) and virtual machines (e.g., VMware and Virtual PC) and avoid
disassembly [2].
SpyBot is written in C with no more than 3,000 lines, and contains many variants
[22]. SpyBot is an enhanced version of SDBot [2]. Aside from an essential command
language implementation, it also involves a scanning capability, host control func-
tion, and the DDoS attack modules and flooding attack (e.g., TCP SYN, ICMP, and
UDP) [2]. SpyBot’s host control capabilities are quite similar to Agobot’s in its re-
mote command execution, process/system manipulation, key logging, and local file
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manipulation [22]. Nevertheless, SpyBot still does not have the capability breadth
and modularity of Agobot [2].
A Global Threat (GT) Bot, known as Aristotles, is supposed to stand for all
mIRC-based bots that have numerous variants and are widely used for Windows [2].
Besides some general capabilities, such as an IRC host control, DoS attacks, port
scanning, and NetBIOS/RPC exploiting, GT Bot also provides a limited set of bi-
naries and scripts for an mIRC [2]. An important binary ”HideWindow” program
is used to keep the mIRC instance invisible from the user [16]. Another function is
recording a response for each command received by remote hosts [22]. Other bina-
ries primarily extend the functions of an mIRC via a Dynamic Link Library (DDL)
[16]. These binary scripts are often stored with files in ”.mrc” or in ”mirc.ini” [22].
Although binaries are named ”mIRC.exe” they may have different capabilities due to
distinct configuration files [2]. Compared to the above examples, GT Bot only pro-
vides limited commands for the host control; a GT bot is just capable of obtaining
local system information and running or deleting local files [22].
An SDBot’s source code is not well written in C and has less than 2,500 lines;
however, its command set, and features are similar to an Agobot [16]. AgoBot is
published under a GNU Public License (GPL) [2]. Although an SDBot has no propa-
gation capabilities and only provides some basic functions for host control, attackers
still like this bot since its commands are easy to extend [22]. With the help of pow-
erful scanning tools, SDBot can easily locate the next victim [2]. For instance, by
using an NetBIOS scanner, it can randomly target a system in any predefined IP
range [22]. Since SDBot is able to send ICMP and UDP packets, it is always used for
simple flooding attacks [2].
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In a peer-to-peer method, messages are exchanged between bots. A Peer-to-peer
method differs from a C&C botnet since there is not a specific single centralized
server. Any bot in this type of structure can be used conceptually, as a command
and control server, by a botmaster using messages propagating to other bots via Peer-
to-Peer once introduced [1]. Recent examples of peer-to-peer botnet are Nugache and
Storm [29].
The developers of Storm have retrofitted and improved their codebase over the
past year, but Storm remains to be a prolific propagator of spam [2]. When Storm’s
worm is at its peak, it is deemed responsible for generating 99% of all spam mes-
sages seen by a large service provider [9]. Storm’s botnet size estimate is difficult to
gauge as it uses a peer-to-peer communication protocol and there was no compre-
hensive measurement study completed [26]. Storm’s effectivness may be attributed
to several factors that distinguish it from prior generations of malware [26]: a) smart
Social Engineering: Email links can be sent through emails that contain subject lines
displaying weather and holidays [26]; b) an ability to spread using client-side vul-
nerabilities: simply, clicking on the wrong URL link to an unsolicited email may be
enough to infect one’s computer, and the apparent pool of users willing to open and
click the URL links in the email may be in the millions [26]; and, c) an effective
obfuscated command and control protocol overlaid on the P2P network [26].
Storm is believed to have an automated distributed denial of service (DDoS)
feature in order to dissuade reverse engineering, which is triggeredbased on situational
awareness gathered from its overlay network [26].
Nugache is a new piece of malware with no command control server to target, bots
capable of sending encrypted packets, and the possibility of any peer on the network
suddenly becoming the de-facto leader of the botnet; Nugache, Dittrich knew, would
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be virtually impossible to stop [29]. No IRC channel means it is difficult to detect
and therefore block, as an IRC is used as command and control [10]. Nugache also
employs a degree of encryption and spreads and communicates in a way that aids in
hiding its activity [10].
The hybrid structure of a botnet can have a combination of both botnets de-
scribed above. This type of botnet structure is very robust and, even if several
servers are incapacitated, the rest of the botnet structure will continue to function.
We refer to this type of botnet as a hybrid structure.
It has been proposed that an advanced hybrid botnet is a peer-to-peer Botnet.
Challenges faced by the botmaster in an advanced hybrid botnet are as follows [47]:
1) how to generate a robust botnet capable of maintaining control of its remaining
bots even after a substantial botnet population has been removed by defenders [47];
2) how to prevent significant exposure of the network topology when some bots are
captured by defenders? 3) How to easily monitor and obtain the complete information
of a botnet by its botmaster; [47] 4) how to prevent (or make it more difficult) for
defenders to detect bots via their communication patterns [47]; 5) and the design
must also take into consideration issues related to a given network. Issues could be
related to IP addresses and the functionalities they perform depending on their online
or oﬄine status.
2.3 Infection Methods
Another important part of a botnet design is the way that a botmaster employs
the distribution of its malware code and infects other systems, thus making them
work as bots. There are various common bot infection methods:
1) Client Application Vulnerabilities: exploiting security bugs to download and install
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malicious program [27]. Another method of ”infection” is through exploiting security
holes within Internet Explorer (IE) [30]. Even if a user does not click on a link within
a web page, a malicious site can deliver its payload of malware [30]. CoolWebSearch,
one of the most notorious pests in recent times, is suspected to be installed by pop-
ups exploiting security holes in IE [30].
2) Exploiting Network Services: this is accomplished by scanning local or IP addresse
subnet in an attempt to exploit network services (RPC, MSSQL etc.) [27].
3) Network Shares: this is accomplished by looking for unsecured computers (default
passwords, public shares) in nearby networks [27].
4) Spam or Unsolicited e-mail: The botnet sends the e-mail with its malicious code
attachments or sometimes with URL links that hide browser exploits [27]. A botmas-
ter can send a link imposing a benign our harmless web page link or it could post
the link on user’s social networking account so that when it is clicked it will lead the
victim to a malicious website. The malicious website uses a flaw in the browser to
install a malware code within the victim’s system. It can also send malicious email
attachments, an old, but reliable method of malware distribution.
5) Peer-to-Peer: Tricking users into downloading and executing fake programs from
P2P networks (both commercial and open source) [27]. Applications such as Cydoor,
New.net, TopText, SaveNow, Webhancer, IncrediFind, and OnFlow are a few of the
applications that are installed through peer-to-peer (P2P) networks such as Kazaa,
Bearshare, Grockster, LimeWire, and Morpheus and may display ad banners and ad
messages, or track Internet surfing habits [30]. Unfortunately, makers of a host pro-
grams might not intend to advertize their programs’s hidden payload [30].
6) Other common methods: Asking for a codec installation needed to watch a video,
install a fake antispyware program that is malicious, and install network acceleration
programs [27]. This scenario occurs when the user visits a website that displays a
13
window whose message states that in order to properly view the website they must
install the program [30]. The FTP / HTTP Get request will initiate the software
download onto the client’s machine [30]. ActiveX (Microsoft technology) is then uti-
lized in order to install the malware (generally as a browser plug-in), on the client’s
system [30]. ActiveX is a mechanism that allows applications to run within other ap-
plications. This installation will allow the malware to operate everytime the browser
is opened [30].
2.4 Communication Protocol
The defining characteristic of a botnet is the fact that each individual bot is
controlled via commands sent by the botmaster. The channel used to communicate
can be implemented using a variety of protocols such as HTTP, P2P, or others.
Currently, a majority of botnets use an Internet Relay Chat (IRC) [18] protocol.
We have already mentioned IRC protocol based bots: AgoBot [22], SpyBot [2] and
GTBot [16]. The most well known HTTP based botnets are machbot [36] and Zeus
[11]. We have already addressed P2P protocol based bots such as Nugache [29] and
Storm [29]. As discussed previously, IRC [18] is preferred for a centralized command
and control based architecture and, hence, this section describes in detail the IRC
[18] protocol. The IRC [18] protocol was specifically designed for text based instant
messaging (IM) among people who are connected to the Internet. In its simple form,
it is a client-server model; in a real world scenario it is used in its distributed form.
In a distributed form all IRC [18] servers are interconnected to one another and
send messages to each other. It uses multiple servers allowing for several forms of
communication where communication could be point-to-point, point to multi-point,
or a combination of both. The communication among systems could be moving files,
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sharing clients, sharing channel information, and others. In an IRC [18] network,
communication traffic is usually not encrypted [25]. All communication is simply
broadcast. This is the reason why these networks are used for communication with
bots that have heavy traffic bandwidth. This could be a reason to raise suspicion.
Recently, botnets have begun to use social networking protocols, such as Twitter, for
command and control [41]. The study [41] discusses about such a Twitter based bot
that was accidently found whose approach was to perform the command and control
method. It used status messages and sent these to all its contacts new links. These
new links can have new commands and executables that can be downloaded and run
on a victim’s system. It attemps to steal information from the victim’s systems and
works by an RSS feed that is provided by Twitter to the user in order to update the
status. Bots decoded messages, which are Base64-encoded URLs, and downloaded
their malicious code [11]. An executable file, such as gbpm.exe and gbpm.dll, are
seen as password and information stealers that accomplished the actual malicious
work [19].
We have used Twitter for building our command and control botnet structure;
however, as we will see, it is very different from the method discussed above for botnet
experimentation. For our project, a botmaster code used Twitter to send commands
to the bots; then as instructed in tweets, bots installed on the victim’s system would
fetch those tweets and perform according to the code already installed on the victim’s
system.
We have outlined various differences between our botnet based on Twitter and
the one mentioned in [41]. Table [29] in the Analysis and Results section demonstrates
why our approach is preferable to the approach mentioned in [41].
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2.5 Trigger Event
A trigger event is when malware becomes active and starts performing its mali-
cious behavior. The triggering event can be identified as a particular date or it can
be a date to launch an evil attack; such as distributed denial of service; or the start
of tracking the behavior of a user surfing on the net, so that this information can be
sent to its botmaster. The triggering event can also be a certain time, as it may be
advantageous for a botnet to be active primarily at night in order to avoid detection.
In which case, the bot would wait until nighttime to begin taking action that involves
heavy network activity, for example, using this method would not alert the user who
would then not notice something suspicious occuring on their system.
Another trigger mechanism could also be using a function the user normally
does online, for example opening a banking site or financial software could trigger the
activation of key logging software [18].
2.6 Covert Channel
A covert channel is a communication path not intended to be used as such by a
system’s designer [35]. Covert channels arise in many situations, particularly within
network communication [35]. Covert channels are virtually impossible to eliminate,
and the emphasis is focused on limiting the capacity of these channels [35].
Covert channel examples can be local channels, or remote network channels [8].
One such example is Multi Level System (MLS) [32]. MLS [32] systems are designed
to restrict legitimate channels of communication [35]. However, a covert channel
provides additional means for information to flow [35]. In an MLS [32] system, a
geneirc user Alice could have a TOP SECRET clearance while user Bob, only has
a confidential access [35]. In this scenario, Alice and Bob could agree that if Alice
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wants to send an 1 to Bob, she will create a file (named xyz) and if she wants to send
a 0 then she will not create such a file. Now that Bob cannot look inside the file xyz
as he does not have required clearance; however, he can query the file system to check
if such a file xyz exists. In this manner information can be passed from Alice to Bob
in a restricted manner.
Using these mechanisms hackers use social media as covert channel to their ad-
vantage and are launching their command and control based attacks. The advantage
they have at their disposal is that social media websites look innocent and are open
to public; therefore, it is extremely difficult to filter out tweets that are harmful such
as command and control compared to genuine and bogus spam that is not responsible
for evil works.
We have used Twitter’s authentication mechanism as our covert channel. The
idea behind using this type of covert channel is that there are innumerable daily public
tweets floating over Twitter. When our botmaster posts its own tweets of commands
they will not look different in any perspective from other tweets and, hence, will not
be treated as suspicious. We rely on its authenticated mechanism to develop this
channel and, though it looks innocent, it actually serves our purpose well without




Twitter supports libraries in Java, Python, C++, and several other languages for
users to integrate their applications within their Twitter profile [39]. Twitter4j [46] is
an unofficial Java library for Twitter APIs. Twitter4j [46] provides several features.
Twitter4j [46] supports any Java version that is 1.4.2 or later. It also supports mobile
operating system platforms such as Android. The main features are that it does not
need an additional jar file in order to integrate an application and it provides the
necessary built-in platform for authentication mechanism such as OAuth [24].
After Twitter migrated from Basic to the OAuth [24] authentication mechanism
for its application, applications can no longer be authenticated by using a Twitter ID
and password through a user’s code. Instead, applications are provided a consumer
string and secret key to accomplish this task.
In our project, we begin by creating a Twitter application. After we create a
Twitter application, Twitter provides an access token string and Access token secret
string that are used to authenticate an application from the Java code with help from
twitter4j API.
In the following section, we describe our application’s details and its setting
information. Next, we discuss the features we have developed and enhanced.
3.1 Application Details
We have created our own application and have named it as tweet4fun [38]. Our
application tweet4fun [38] has access levels such as ”Read, Write, and Direct mes-
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sage”. This means that by using this application we can fetch tweets, update the
status, and direct the tweet to other applications and accounts. There is one con-
sumer key and consumer secret that remains constant throughout the life of an appli-
cation. We now have obtained request token and access token URL. By using these,
application requests for the token key and token secret strings to be used later with
our desktop application. Our application’s setting details in Figure 3 demonstrates
an important field, ”Authorize URL”, that is used to prompt a user to manually
authorize an application. Later, we will see that this requirement can be automated
as well. Other items to notice are that we obtain access token and access token secret
string. These are both the actual key and secret strings that are used to connect our
web application within our desktop application.
Figure 3: tweet4fun Setting Details.
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3.1.1 Logging into Twitter Account
We have automated the process for the botmaster to log-on to its twitter account.
However, in actuality it is not needed as the OAuth [17] mechanism provided by
Twitter performs that work for the botmaster. The added benefit of keeping the
login prompt is that if the botmaster code is somehow hacked or compromised then
accessing to botmaster’s Twitter account can be prevented.
In Figure 4 we mention the algorithm used to develop a panel in order to accept
Twitter ID and Password. After the botmaster enters TwitterID and Password,
the verifyCredentials() api is called up from the Twitter4j and which verifies
the botmaster’s credentials and, depending on the verification, the botmaster is
authorized or unauthorized.
Figure 4: Login Prompt Algorithm.
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Figure 5 and 6 show the login and authentication prompt.
Figure 5: Login Prompt.
Figure 6: Login Authentication Message.
3.1.2 Email Functionality
We have created an emailing feature so that the exchange of data between bots
and botmaster can occur seemlessly and efficiently. To accomplish this task, we
have used an SMTP Authenticator class from a javax.mail.Authenticator library. We
created an object of this class and called it auth and similarly; we also created an
object of Properties class from the same library and called it as prop. We called
getInstance() api from the class Session imported from a javax.mail.Session library
and we passed both the above objects into this api. After this was acomplished
successfully we had a session established between bot and the botmaster.
Next we created our mesg object from MimeMessage class imported from a
javax.mail.Message library, and then wrapped it with the session object (created
above). Now with this mesg object we attached text message, subject, ”From” ad-
dress, ”To” address and then we called the static method of the class Transport from
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javax.mail.Transport library, depending upon the session in the mesg object and the
”From” and ”To” addresses it sends email to the recipient along with the other details.
Figure 7: Email Functionality
3.1.3 Generic Attack
For our project we have developed one general attack. The idea behind naming
it a general attack is that with this attack we can easily integrate new attacks into
our system. The attack is named as ”run”. This command accepts the 140 character
tweet from Twitter profile and then it parses the second token string after the ”run”
command token. This second token string is treated as subcommand to perform
a specified attack. This is flexibile as we can easily keep adding additional new
commands to this ”run” command and, hence, we do not need to develop a complete
new command with a different name. Currently, ”run” has three sub comamnds as
defined: ”checkSystem”, ”NICs”, and ”Screenshot”.
The subcommand ”checkSystem” checks for the user’s home directory path and
mails back this information to the botmaster using an Email.java utility. The ”NICs”
subcommand locates the network interface card details belonging to the victim’s
system and mails this information to botmaster. The ”screenshot” subcommand
captures userwork’s screenshot while the user is busy completing important work and




3.2.1 Authentication Mechanism from Basic to OAuth
As we discussed in the previous chapters, we used a token keyword and token
secret string to authenticate our web application within the desktop application. For
authenticating we first created a Twitter class object. The Twitter class object is
normally used to keep a TwitterFacotry() instance. With this object we can call the
setOuathConsumer() api. In the api setOAuthConsumer(), we pass the consumer
key and consumer secret for authenticating the application. In next step we request
the accessToken string with getOAuthRequestToken(). This accessToken string is
primarily an integer PIN number. This PIN can be passed within loadAccessToken()
api to load the user’s actual token key and token secret. If this PIN is not stored
for further use, then the accessToken string is null and, in this case, each time this
code is run for authentication it will generate a new PIN and will prompt the user to
authorize the application manually. In our case, we are storing this PIN for further
use and therefore we utomated the task of manual authorization for our application.
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Figure 8: Twitter Authentication Algorithm.
As previously discussed when we authroize the application for the first time, we
obtain an integer PIN. Figure 9 presents an output prompt showing an URL to be
visited and asks the user to enter that information within the browser.
Figure 9: One Off Authentication.
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Figure 10 presents the authorization prompt asking the user to authorize the
application manually, after opening the following URL in their browser.
Figure 10: Open URL and Authorize the Application.
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After the user manually authorizes the application, they get a pin number that
can be entered on the command prompt that runs the java botmaster code. Now
to automate this process, we can store the PIN obtained from our application and
pass it to a loadAccessToken() api. Figure 11 shows a 7-digit pin number that was
generated by our application authorization process.
Figure 11: 7-Digit Pin to Complete the Authorization Process.
Using our tweet4fun [38] application, we can post various tweets to botmaster’s
Twitter account. The tweets can be random twitter spam (such as text tweets about
sharing some information). They can be in the command and control form for our
bots.
3.2.2 Command & Control Keyword Generator
We developed our own key generator that will generate a daily new keyword.
The character choices include all 26 Latin characters and additional alpha-numeric
characters.
We calculated the current system-time using a getTime() function imported from
a Java.util.Date library. The time is essentially, in the milliseconds returned by
getTime() function.
Next, we calculated the total number of milliseconds within a day and determined
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this number to be 24 ·60 ·60 ·1000. We stored this value as a variable and named it as
”atime”. We calculated the modulus of this value, ”atime”, along with the number
of keywords defined in our text file keyword.txt.
Figure 12 presents our pseudo-code showing the index caluclated in order to
select a keyword:
Figure 12: Key Generation Algorithm.
As previously discussed, we have a keyword.txt file that stored a number of
keywords approximately 300. After calculating the modulus, we obtained an index
number of the keyword chosen from the keyword.txt. Sample keywords from the file
keyword.txt are as shown in Table 4.














These are the actual keywords used for the command. We appended the #
symbol with a keyword before the command and that made up a complete tweet that
was posted by a botmaster on its Twitter account. An example of the format for the
tweet that was posted:
#metacafe browse http://www.sjsu.edu
As we see metacafe is the keyword pre-appended with # and next is the actual
”browse” command; and next token of the string is basically the URL of the web-link
that is opened by the bots after parsing. Using a keyword within the tweet gives
us the added security and also search convenience. Since the keyword being used
continously changes so if a botmaster decides to post excessive tweets, then over time
the tweets will change automatically and it will less raise less suspicion; as the tweets
will not be repetitive in nature.
The other important advantage is that a keyword can be used as a query object




In our project, several attacks based on command and control have been devel-
oped. Attacks such as ”Fetch Botmaster Status”, ”Update and Fetch Recent Status”,
and ”Fetch User Information” are for demonstration purpose and are related to fetch
the user’s information such as the most recent updated status, updating their status,
and fetching their last twenty statuses, finding a follower’s Twitter ID, fetching profile
pictures of these followers, and also finding MAC address of a victim’s system.
The rest of the attacks are more malicious and they are basically related to do
something more malicious on a victim’s systems. They basically open a particular
web browser for an advertisement promotion, can make the system shutdown, can
take a screenshot of a user’s work, can email a confidential file to a botmaster, can
email the system’s information succh as NIC card details, can email the user’s home
directory path, and also can execute DOS commands on the victim’s system. We
have explained each of these attacks in details in following section.
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4.1 Fetching Botmaster’s Tweet
The last tweet completed by a botmaster can be fetched by a malware code
installed on the victim’s system. In Figure 14, snapshot of the tweet done is for
demonstration purposes; this is not the actual command-tweet posted by the bot-
master. To verify credentials we call the verifyCredential() API form Twitter4j [46]
library and then we use the getUserTImeline() API from the Twitter4j [46] to fetch
the tweet. Figure 13, below, is an example of code snippet.
Figure 13: Fetching Last Tweet Algorithm
Figure 14 and 15 show the graphical user interfaces developed in Swing.
Figure 14: Fetching Last Tweet Figure 1
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Figure 15: Fetching Last Tweet Figure 2
4.2 Update Status and Fetch Last Twenty Status
Not only is the last command/tweet posted by a botmaster is accessible, the
getUserTImeline() api from the twitter4j API for the last 20 statuses, can be fetched.
It helps to keep track of the previous botmaster commands that were posted by the
botmaster. Using this method we can redo past attacks on the victim’s system if
instructed by the botmaster in the near future. To fetch the status tweets we call
the getUserTimeline() API from the Twitter4j [46] library. This provides a facility in
order to fetch the most recent 20 statuses. Also, to update the status in text form we
can call txtUpdateStatus class’s getText() from the Twitter4j library. We have our
exception handling if a Twitter error occurs.
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Figure 16: Update and Fetch Status Alogirthm
Figure 17: Update and Fetch Status Figure 1
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Figure 18: Update and Fetch Status Figure 2
Figure 19: Update and Fetch Status Figure 3
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Figure 20: Update and Fetch Status Figure 4
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4.3 Fetching Follower Information
Using the getFollowersIDs() API from the Twitter4j [46] library, we can deter-
mine the numeric id that Twitter uses to keep track of botmaster’s all followers. With
these IDs, we can obtain Twitter screen names and profile pictures of botmaster’s all
followers using getScreenName() and getProfilePic() APIs from Twitter4j. All this
information keeps track of the followers that are following the bot masters so that
later they can be exploited by a command and control attack by the malware code.
Figure 21 shows the pseudo code to achieve this.
Figure 21: Fetch Follower Information Algorithm
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Figure 22 shows the output and Figure 23 shows the profile picture of a follower.
Figure 22: Fetch Follower Information
Figure 23: Fetch Follower Image
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Since our botnet is intended for a Windows operating system, it may not work
correctly on other types of operating system such as Mac or Linux. Specifically, it
would not be able to add itself at startup, though it could be relatively easy to add a
line to user’s .bashrc file to start it. We have implemented a multitude of commands
which it can handle. For instance, our botnet supports running a Distributed Denial
of Service (DDoS) on a server/website, taking screenshots (this can later be sent to the
botmaster), downloading, uploading, or executing a file, shutting down or restarting
the user’s computer.
4.4 Finding the MAC address of the system
In this attack, after the botmaster tweets the ”find” command on Twitter profile,
the victim computer’s MAC address is obtained by the malware running on the system
and is mailed to the botmaster. Figure 24 shows the example code snippet.
Figure 24: Finding MAC Address Algorithm
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When we run the Figure 24 algorithm, we obtain the MAC address for our
system.
C0-CB-38-80-56-CD
4.5 Browsing a Webpage
This attack was developed during a class project [21][37]. For our purposes, we
borrowed the same idea and used it for our application. While the Botmaster.java
and the malware program StockInfo.java are running, the botmaster can give the
command: ”#keyword browse www.sjsu.edu” on the command line to the Botmas-
ter.java program. After successful authentication, the command is posted in the form
of a tweet to the Twitter account.
The StockInfo (ConnectToTwitter.java) java program will fetch the tweet from
the account. The tweet will be parsed by the CommandParser.java program for
the string tokens. After the string token matches with the ”Browse” command the
OpenURI() API with the token will be called and the intended webpage will be
opened within the default browser.
Figure 25: Browsing a Webpage Algorithm
Figure 26, 27 and 28 show the tweet posting on Twitter account of Botmaster.
Figure 29 shows the tweet fetching from Twitter in the form of a ”bit.ly” format.
Figure 30 shows the URL opened within the default browser.
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Figure 26: Browsing a Webpage Figure 1
Figure 27: Browsing a Webpage Figure 2
Figure 28: Browsing a Webpage Figure 3
Figure 29: Browsing a Webpage Figure 4
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Figure 30: Browsing a Webpage Figure 5
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4.6 Finding the NIC details
We can obtain the target system’s network interfaces and can then mail to the
botmaster using the emailer.java code. For this purpose we call getInetAddress()
API from a javax.inetaddress library, pass the return value to list() API from the
Collection library in Java and fetch the network interface card details:
Figure 31: NIC Details Algorithm
4.7 Stop Services by Shutdown
This attack was developed in [21][37]. We borrowed the same idea for our ap-
plication. In this attack, the botmaster tweets the following: ”#keyword shutdown”
on its account by using the botmaster.java code. The tweet is fetched by the Stock-
Info.java, the malware installed on the victim’s computer, and, after parsing the tweet
in terms of tokens, a shutdown system call is invoked on the victim’s system as shown
in Figure 32. Figure 33 shows the output when tweet is fetched from Twitter and
Figure 34 shows the shutdown prompt after the shutdown system call is executed.
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Figure 32: Shutdown Algorithm
Figure 33: Shutdown System Figure 1
Figure 34: Shutdown System Figure 2
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4.8 Restart System
This attack was also part of [21][37]. We have used the same idea in our appli-
cation and it is more or less similar to the shutdown attack. The only difference is
that it restarts the victim’s system. Figure 35 shows the pseudo code and Figure 36
shows a common restart prompt.
Figure 35: Restart the System
Figure 36: Restart the System Figure
4.9 Taking the screenshot of the user work
This attack was part of the [21][37] and we borrowed the same idea in our ap-
plication. This attack involves taking a snapshot of user’s work with the use of the
malware running on the victim’s computer. Over time it can take a screenshot and
save it to a specified path determined by the botmaster. Figure 37 demonstrates an
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example of the code responsible for this action. The Image, Graphics and Robot class
[4] are provided by java APIs, and the methods writeImage() and createTimeStamp-
Str() are user coded methods. Figure 38 shows the command in action;
Figure 37: Capturing the Screenshot Algorithm
Figure 38: Capturing the Screenshot
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After fetching the tweet from the botmaster’s account, StockInfo.java code saves
the screenshot within the specified path:
C:/My Documents/NetBeansProjects/TwitterApplications/ with the name for
example: screenCapture 20120325 053134.PNG.
4.10 Uploading user information to botmaster
After the screenshot of the user’s work is saved it can be mailed to the botmaster
with a pseudo code as shown in Figure 39.
Figure 39: Uploading the Information Algorithm
As discussed earlier, we have developed an Emailer.java code in order to send
specified emails back to the botmaster. Figure 40 below shows the output for the
screenCapture.PNG that has been sent to the botmaster.
Figure 40: Uploading the Information
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4.11 Executing the commands in file
This attack could be very harmful and evil for the affected victim’s system de-
pending on the level of permission that malware has obtained. In this attack the
botmaster will send a file written with commands. After fetching the tweet with the
”execute” command, the malware searches for file mycommand to run.txt in user’s
system path C:/Documents and Settings/singha. Next, it processes each command
line by line and performes as instructed within the commands. For a sample we have
given DOS commands with our Windows XP system.
Ex: dir /s (will list all the directories and subdirectories in the given path loca-
tion)
Figure 41: Executing the Passed Commands Figure 1
The mycommand to run.txt has only one DOS command and that is dir /s. It
lists all of the sub directories and files within the directory.
The idea is that we can continue to add DOS commands, depending on the
permission and access level, causing a considerable damage to the victim’s system.
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Figure 42: Executing the Passed Commands Figure 2
4.12 Change ”From” and ”To” address
In this attack a botmaster can post a tweet with a command as change. Basically
this attack was developed so that a botmaster uses a different mail address with
different bots in order to keep track of the data being exchanged.
With this malware code, we pass a text file that we call address.txt. This file
contains the email address of the botmaster and email address of the bots within the
network.
After a bot fetches and parses the tweet from the botmaster Twitter profile, it
obtains that string 1 and string 2. Which are the intended email ids to be replaced
within the address.txt.
After this step, the keyword.txt file is overwritten with the new email addresses
and new email ids are used for further communication.
Figure 43: Change the ”From” and ”To” Addresses Algorithm
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Figure 44: Change the ”From” and ”To” Addresses Figure 1
Figure 45: Change the ”From” and ”To” Addresses Figure 2
Figure 46: Change the ”From” and ”To” Addresses Figure 3
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5.1 Stealth of Malware
The malware code is related to two main java programs continued to run while
the malware is in action. We have Botmaster.java code inorder to post commands
on botmaster’s Twitter profile, and StockInfo.java installed on the victim’s system
inorder to fetch commands and perform as instructed by the botmaster.
Botmaster.java is used to authenticate the application and also to post the tweet
after successful authentication. To tweet the post on the botmaster’s account it uses
twitter’s updateStatus() function. This program runs in an infinite loop and keeps
accepting the commands in terms of tweets from the botmaster. Each successive
command is posted on botmaster’s Twitter account.
A StockInfo.java program is used as the actual malware within the end/bot
systems and it internally runs the java program ConnectToTwitter.java. Since it is
in the form of a normal program, an antivirus program considers this program to be
an innocent java code and does not consider themas threatening:
In Figure 48 the task manager shows two Java programs running. Both tasks
begin with name of java.exe. They are, Botmaster.java and StockInfo.java.
In Figure 49 we see that an antivirus (Symantec End Point Protection) cannot
detect our malware StockInfo.java and reports that ”Your computer is protected”.
50
Figure 48: Stealth of the Malware from the Task Manager
Figure 49: Stealth of Malware from the Anti-virus
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5.2 Spam
Typically one of the main uses for a botnet is to send spamming emails [1]. There
are Java libraries that allow for sending of outgoing email, as well as other methods to
accomplish this from a home computer. However, many email services will not accept
email sent in this way [15]. Email services employ a reverse lookup on the hostname
machine used to send an email, and, if this fails, it will generally refuse to pass the
emailalong [15]. The way spam is sent on a large scale is to use email servers that are
configured or misconfigured, to relay email from hosts that are unauthenticated-these
are called open relays [18]. Open relays are available on the Internet. Using this
method presents an opportunity to get into trouble. There is a chance of having our
botnet code seen as sending spam, and it is possible that a relay could be acting as
a honeypot; in which case our botnet code could attract the attention of malware
researchers, both outcomes we wanted to avoid [18].
5.3 Defense of the botnet through daily key updates
The key generation makes sure that a new key is picked daily from the text file by
hashing the indexes. The benefit of searching for a daily key, instead of a specific user
account, is to prevent the shutdown of the botmaster. With keys that change daily,
the botmaster commands can be posted on many different user accounts. Therefore,
if Twitter shuts down one account, we can always create a new Twitter account and
so our botmaster will not terminate easily.
5.4 Current Command and Control Botnet Trends
Over two-year period a study [20] of over 1.1 million botnet submissions found
that the use of an IRC for communications was in decline. Bot operators moved
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away from public command-and-control channels because security researchers have
had too much success analyzing the botnets that use these communication modes
such as Internet relay chat (IRC) [20].
In a recent paper [3], a drop in use of an IRC for command and control was seen
between the start of 2007 and the end of 2008 [20].
The author in [3] argues that it will be easy to hide within the noise of Twitter.
Since shortened URLs are common, and services such as bit.ly have trouble scan-
ning the destination of every link they handle, defending against botnets that abuse
Twitter as a communications medium is difficult [20].




In this last chapter we discuss the setup of our experimental design. We compare
our botnet with a Twitter-based NazBot. We list the number testcases executed.
6.1 Setup of Our Botnet
In our experimental setup, we built a network of 7 bots due to practical restric-
tions. The setup can be extended for larger networks if we gain more actual physical
systems, as is the usual case with botmasters in practice. Out of 7 we had 2 actual
systems and 5 virtual machines. The 2 actual systems had Windows XP and Ubuntu
12.04 (64 bit) Debian Kernel 3.2.0+ installed. The virtual machines had 3 XP, 1 Win-
dows 7 and 1 Ubuntu 11.10 (64 bit) installed. All 3 of the 5 XP virtual machines had
RAM of 512 MB and 32 MB of graphics memory. The one Virtual Ubuntu machine
had 1 GB of RAM and 32 MB of graphics memory. The actual Ubuntu machine had
4 GB of RAM and 128 MB of graphics memory. The one Windows 7 virtual machine
had 1 GB of RAM and 64 MB of graphics memory. One actual Windows XP worked
as the C&C botmaster and it had both the botmaster code and bot codes. It had
4 GB of RAM and 128 MB of graphics. The rest 6 machines had just the botcodes
installed. The machine containing the botmaster code would tweet commands on its
Twitter account. At the same time, machines running botcodes would keep query-
ing from the Twitter search engine with pre-formatted keywords and look for those
commands. For virtualization, both VMWare Player and Oracle Virtual Box were
used.
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Depending on the Internet connectivity, as soon as they would fetch the code
they would process described commands and, based on the system’s speed, they
would perform as instructed. They all were tested simultaneously and the tests were
successful and performed as expected.
Table 5: Experimental Setup.
Setup Operating System Memory (RAM) CPU (2.79 GHz)
Botmaster (Bot) Windows XP 4 GB i7
Bot 1 Ubuntu 12.04 4 GB i3
Bot 2 Windows 7 1 GB i7
Bot 3 Windows XP 512 MB i3
Bot 4 Windows XP 512 MB i3
Bot 5 Windows XP 512 MB i3
Bot 6 Ubuntu 12.04 1 GB i3
Figure 51 shows the botmaster posting commands in the form of tweets on their
Twitter account. The command is for browsing a webpage on the bot’s browsers.
Figure 52 shows the victim’s system running the bot code. In this example, inorder
to increase the number of bots, we have created virtual machines and, hence, we
can see that there are more than just one bot (Figure 52) running the bot code and
opening the webpage instructed by the botmaster.
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Figure 51: Botmaster in Action
Figure 52: Bots in Action
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6.2 Comparison with Twitter-based NazBot
Kartaltepe [19] mentions one Twitter based command and control botnet
identified recently. He has nicknamed it NazBot [19]. NazBot makes an HTTP
GET request to upd4t3s twitter RSS feed [19]. It returns the RSS feed containing
Base64-encoded text. A bot decodes the text as bit.ly URLs and makes a request to
each [19]. NazBot redirects the malicious zip file to the bot [19]. Bot downloads it,
unzips it, and executes its contents [19]. It gathers and transmits the information to
the botmaster [19]. The executables, such as gbpm.exe and gbpm.dll, have been used
for stealing password and other important information [19]. The NazBot abused
popular websites such as Twitter and Facebook [19]. It exploited a popular port 80
used for an HTTP request and response for command and control communication
[19]. Using an RSS feed to auto-update bots is similar to normal communication
traffic. This made it look unsuspicious to Twitter or general public.
Figure 53: Twitter Based NazBot
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Table 6 shows the differences between the functionality of NazBot and our
Twitter based Command and Control Botnet.
Table 6: Comparison with NazBot
NazBot Our Twitter-based Botnet
Bots read the RSS feed Bots read status message
Had a website to upload in-
formation
Use email functionality to email
information
Fixed port 80 is used No port used
Executables were down-
loaded from the website
Executables were already sent
with infection
Everytime code was down-
loaded it needed to be un-
zipped and installed on vic-
tim system
After reading the tweets bots per-




ing the information and ex-
ecutables
Flexible email approach
Our botnet performs better than NazBot in many ways. Since, it uses the normal
status post it looks very innocent to common public. There are millions of tweets per-
day floating over Twitter and, similarly, there are thousands of query for the tweets,
suspicion is not raised. However, with RSS feeds, fetching and uploading information
to a particular web server could be risky as there can be heavy communication traffic
directed towards a web server. Using a websever on a fixed port 80 made NazBot
weaker; however, in our approach we do not have this port requirement. For handling
the communication in an easy and efficient manner we relied on an email method;
and for this purpose we developed our email functionality as discussed in the chapter
5. Also, since we installed the botcode only once, we do not have user end processing
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for a malicious code, unlike Nazbot where executables were downloaded, unzipped,
and executed to perform its action.
6.3 Test Cases
In our project a new Twitter account was created solely for our project and, as
our project progressed, the number of tweets being posted gradually increased, the
number of followers slowly increased. The account worked as a benchmark for our
entire project. Table 7 lists some of the test cases and statistics for our project and
experiment.
Table 7: Test Cases
Total commands Developed 13
No of Tweets Posted 350+
No of followers following
botmaster
20+
No of Followers botmaster
followed
110+
6.4 Twitter’s Limitations on API Usage
Twitter provides all support and services to developers for developing their appli-
cations. However, Twitter limits and restricts the support in such a way that it should
not used for malicious purpose. The text that is to be updated is compared with the
authenticated user’s tweets that are recently posted. Any attempt that results in du-
plication will be blocked resulting in a 403 error [39]. Therefore, a same status cannot
be posted twice by the user. There is a limited number of tweets that a user can cre-
ate at a given time. If an allowed limit is crossed, then a user gets an HTTP 403
error. While passing the command in the form of a tweet to the updateStatus() api
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there are few things to be taken into considerations [39]: The text of status update,
typically up to 140 characters, and URL encode as necessary, with t.co link wrapping
may affect character counts. The Twitter API only allows clients to make a limited
number of calls within a given hour. This policy affects the APIs in different ways.
Twitter imposes the restriction on the usage of the APIs either by limiting the API
rate or by blacklisting the application. The default request rate limit is allowed upto
350 every hour. It is calculated with oauth token used [45]. Rate limits are applied
to methods that request information with an HTTP GET command [45]. Generally
API methods that use HTTP POST to submit data to Twitter are not rate limited,
however some methods are now being rate limited. Every method within the API
documentation explains if it is rate limited or not [45]. Actions such as publishing
status updates, sending direct messages, following, and un-following are not directly
rate limited by the API but are subject to fair use limits [40]. These Twitter Limits
are described on their help site [40].
The rate limit of 350 per-hour must be honored [44]. If a user’s application
abuses the rate limits then it will be blacklisted [44]. If a user is blacklisted they will
be unable to get a response from the Twitter API [44]. If a user or application has
been blacklisted, and the user thinks there has been an error, the user can contact
Twitter’s email address on the support [44].
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusion and Future Work
We have developed a systematically Twitter based Social Networking Command
and Control Botnet. We automated the process for logging-on to a Twitter account
for a botmaster within the application. This avoids the compromise of our botmaster
account and adds to security avoiding the misuse of a botmaster code. To help provide
better and efficient communication between botmaster and bots we have developed
email functionality.
Our key generation algorithm creates the different tweets for the same attacks at
a given point of time and hence avoids our tweets from being repetitive. The idea of
having a keyword helps in fetching the tweets as a query from Twitter search engine.
From the attack’s point of view, we have simulated our botnet with different
types of attacks. The attacks include: browsing the web page, fetching the user
information from Twitter profile in the form of a Twitter ID, and profile picture etc,
stopping and restarting the services running at victim’s system, mailing confidential
files to the botmaster, capturing information regarding user’s work and sending it to
the botmaster, processing DOS commands by a bot within the victim’s system, and
others.
For future work, although we have performed several tests this is the usual case
in practice, and scope to accomplish more still exists. From the key generation’s
point of view, in order to avoid detection by Twitter; our bot could use a daily key
for encrypting the commands themselves. This way, a researcher would not be able
to find any suspicious commands being issued through Twitter. In addition, simply
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having a daily key is not enough; theoretically a researcher could obtain a copy of
the botnet, and reverse engineer the daily key algorithm. Therefore, we could add
an extra command for adding a specific salt to the key generator. The advantage
of doing this is that researchers would not be able to trace back the salt, to reverse
engineer, and find out the key generation algorithm.
We are storing keywords within a text file and that is always fixed throughout
the complete lifetime of the whole botnet. Next, we can create a mechanism that will
keep changing the keyword.txt file with an updated list of keywords. We would have
to make sure that both the replica of the file at the botmaster and bot ends are the
same and not inconsistent. To avoid detection, we can create an encryption and a
decryption mechanism for the keyword.txt file.
Further in the attack, we send the text file with DOS commands with a malware
code. These DOS commands are fixed throughout the life of the bot. So for future
work, we can design a mechanism to change the commands within the text file, based
on the botmaster’s next attack requirement. The generic command ”run” provides
three functionalities developed within our project, they are: ”checkSystem”, ”NICs”
and ”screenshot”.
The idea behind developing a general command is that it can perform various
attacks as we continue to add several more subcommands.
Finally, from defense point of view, Twitter must develop a preventive and
counter measure that will look for suspicious tweets.
The defense mechanism can be based on various factors. Twitter could check
for various applications that are posting excessive tweets by using keywords, text
commands, and tiny URLs. Addtionally, keeping track of specific query traffic created
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by various systems on Twitter’s search engine would also help. If Twitter finds
malicious activity it can warn the application developer. However, if the misuse of
Twitter’s authentication continues, then Twitter can track down and suspend the
account. For that matter, it can track down the IP addresses and other details, then
blacklist users and their profiles from continuing their malicious activity in the future.
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